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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950213-CA 
v. : 
JAMES LEE MORENO : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1991), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable James L. Sawaya, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly hold that the officer's 
seizure of a paper bindle from the front seat of defendant's car 
was based on both probable cause and exigent circumstances, the 
two requirements of the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement? 
The trial court's underlying factual determinations are 
reviewed for clear error, while the court's legal conclusion of 
probable cause is reviewed for correctness, according the trial 
court a "measure of discretion." State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531, 
533 (Utah 1994) (reviewing the trial court's factual and legal 
determinations of probable cause under the same standards applied 
to determinations of reasonable suspicion, as articulated in 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994)). The same 
bifurcated standard is applied to the trial court's factual and 
legal determination of exigent circumstances. City of Orem v. 
Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1994). 
2. Was the officer's seizure of the bindle of cocaine 
proper incident to defendant's arrest? The trial court did not 
rule on this point; however, this court may affirm the trial 
court's ruling on any proper ground. State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 
1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, James Lee Moreno, was charged with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1991) (Count 
I), and prostitution, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (Supp. 1991) (Count II) (R. 06). 
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the 
search of his car (R. 29). The trial court denied the motion (R. 
33-34) . Thereafter, defendant conditionally pled guilty to 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and the 
prostitution charge was dismissed (R. 41-44, 60). The trial 
court sentenced defendant to a term not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison, but granted defendant a stay, placed him 
on probation and later issued defendant a certificate of probable 
cause (R. 49, 60). 
Defendant timely appealed from his judgment of conviction 
(case no. 930009-CA) (R. 53). That appeal was briefed and 
submitted to this Court, which vacated the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress and remanded the case to the 
trial court for entry of adequate findings (R. 93). The trial 
court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order 
("Findings," R. 97-99, attached as Addendum A), and defendant 
appealed from those findings (case no, 950213-CA) (R. 103). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On the evening of October 23, 1991, defendant approached a 
woman on Main Street in Salt Lake City and offered her $35.00 to 
"party" with him (R. 73). The woman, who was acting as a police 
decoy, agreed and told defendant to follow her in his car (R. 72-
73). When they arrived at the parking lot of the nearby Colonial 
Hotel, defendant got out of his car and locked it (R. 73). 
Meanwhile, two Salt Lake City police officers, working the 
undercover operation with the decoy, also pulled into the parking 
lot, one in front of and one following defendant's vehicle (R. 
78, 83)• Officer Harris approached defendant, arrested him for 
soliciting, handcuffed him, searched him, and placed the items 
found in the search, including defendant's car keys, on top of 
defendant's vehicle. Harris then accompanied defendant into a 
police car, where he began writing out a citation (R. 78, 83-84) . 
Following the arrest, Officer Jackson, who was also on the 
scene, approached defendant's car, looked through the window, and 
saw "a folded bindle, the type you carry cocaine in" located on 
the passenger side front seat (R. 79, 84). Jackson walked over 
to Officer Harris, who was sitting in the patrol vehicle with 
defendant, and said, "I want you to come back and witness this" 
(R. 79). Jackson pointed out the bindle on the front seat ta 
Harris and then, taking the keys off the car roof, unlocked the 
vehicle, and removed the bindle. It contained a white powder, 
1
 The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress is attached in its entirely as Addendum B. 
4 
which field-tested positive for cocaine (R. 79). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court properly concluded that the police officers' 
entry into defendant's car in order to effectuate the seizure of 
evidence in open view was constitutionally lawful because it 
fulfilled both requirements of the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
The first element, probable cause, was established when the 
officer, prior to making any intrusion, observed a paper bindle 
through the car window in open view on the front seat of 
defendant's car. The officer's observation, based on their 
experience, of a distinctively configured piece of evidence was 
sufficient to establish probable cause that the bindle was 
associated with criminal activity. 
Second, the location of the evidence, presenting an obvious 
invitation to theft and subsequent destruction of the evidence, 
as well as protection of the public from access to the drugs, 
created the exigent circumstances necessary to seize the evidence 
immediately. Contrary to defendant's assertion, there was no 
showing that a telephonic warrant could easily be obtained. 
PQTNT II 
The seizure of the bindle of cocaine was justified under the 
search incident to arrest exception against the general 
prohibition against warrantless searches, as an alternative 
ground for affirming the denial of defendant's motion to 
5 
suppress. The exception has been expanded under New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), and its progeny, to 
provide a bright-line rule for law enforcement to seize 
destructible evidence incident to arrests, even in cases where a 
defendant does not appear to have ready access or control over 
seized items. Considering the weight of authority, recognized by 
Utah's appellate courts, the search incident to arrest exception 
justifies the seizure of the cocaine bindles in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO DEFENDANT'S 
CAR AND SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE IN 
OPEN VIEW WAS LAWFUL: THE OFFICERS' 
OBSERVATION OF THE BINDLE PROVIDED PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO EFFECTUATE THE SEIZURE; PREVENTING 
DESTRUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE AND PROTECTING 
THE PUBLIC FROM ACCESS TO THE DRUGS 
CONSTITUTED THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
NECESSARY TO SECURE THE BINDLE IMMEDIATELY. 
A. Probable Cause. 
A warrantless search or seizure will be unreasonable per se 
under federal or state law unless it falls within one of the 
specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990); Katz v. United 
States. 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967). In Utah, in 
order to fulfill the requirements of the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement, the State must establish both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances, State v. Morck. 821 P.2d 1190, 
1193 (Utah App. 1991); however, the trial court's determination 
of probable cause requires only a "substantial basis," based on 
6 
the totality of circumstances- State v. White. 851 P.2d 1195, 
1198 (Utah App. 1993) (reviewing the trial court's determination 
of a magistrate's issuance of a warrant). 
The gist of defendant's argument appears to be two-fold. 
First, defendant asserts that the folded paper bindle that the 
officers observed on the front seat of defendant's locked car was 
insufficient to establish probable cause to open the car door and 
seize the evidence. Thus, the acts of unlocking and opening the 
car door constituted an unlawful search. And second, even 
assuming probable cause arguendo, defendant claims no exigent 
circumstances existed to justify seizure of the bindle without a 
warrant. Appellant's Br. at 8-13. 
As to defendant's first contention, probable cause to open 
the car door and remove the evidence was established as soon as 
the officer, prior to making any intrusion, simply observed the 
bindle in open view on the front seat through the car window.2 
State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175, 181 (Utah 1983). At this point, 
no search had occurred, defendant had no expectation of privacy 
in the contraband, and the federal and state guarantees against 
unreasonable searches and seizures had not yet come into play. 
As the United States Supreme Court observed in a case 
involving a police officer who stopped a vehicle, saw a partially 
2
 The open view doctrine applies to preintrusive police 
observation, such as is present in this case. In contrast, the 
plain view doctrine is postintrusive, coming into play only when a 
lawful search is already underway. See State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 
175, 181 (Utah 1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738, n.4 (1983) 
(opinion of Rehnquist, J.). 
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concealed balloon, and then shifted his position to get a better 
view: "The general public could peer into the interior of 
[defendant's] automobile from any number of angles; there is no 
reason [the police officer] should be precluded from observing as 
an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private 
citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy." Texas 
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1983) 
(plurality). The view of the Utah Supreme Court is consistent 
with the federal position: 
The constitutional interests protected by the 
prohibition against unlawful searches do not 
require the police to be less observant than 
the average person. Nor must a police 
officer avert his gaze from contraband 
because a criminal wishes to avoid detection. 
A desire to avoid detection of criminal 
activity does not ipso facto give rise to a 
protectable privacy interest. 
Thus, an officer is not expected to ignore 
what is exposed to observation from a 
position where he is lawfully entitled to be, 
and he may view the interior of a vehicle 
from such a position. That does not 
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of 
the constitutional provisions. 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah), cert, denied. 454 U.S. 
1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981) (citations omitted). 
The trial court found that at the time defendant was 
arrested "Officer Jackson looked through the window of 
defendant's vehicle and observed what his experience led him to 
believe was a 'bindle of cocaine' on the passenger seat" 
6 
(Findings, par. 2 and 3, R. 98).3 
3
 Defendant's lengthy attack on these and other specific 
findings and conclusions, Appellant's Br. at 14-19, does not 
merit a commensurate response. Specifically, defendant 
challenges: (1) the finding that defendant "jumped from his car 
and quickly locked it," (finding #1) for lack of evidentiary 
support; (2) the omission of the police officers' request, and 
defendant's refusal, for consent to search his car (findings #2 
and #3); (3) the sufficiency of the characteristically folded 
paper to establish it as incriminating evidence before it had 
actually been opened and found to contain a controlled substance 
(finding #3 and conclusion #3); and (4) the conclusion that there 
were exigent circumstances justifying the search when there was 
no evidence that police officers were concerned that the bindle 
would be stolen or destroyed (conclusion #4). 
Because defendant made entirely different objections below 
than he does on appeal, he has failed to preserve his specific 
challenges on appeal and this Court should refuse to consider 
them (see Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, R. 101-02, attached as Addendum C, objecting to findings 
and conclusions that defendant's car was "sandwiched" by two 
police cars, that the police officer had experience with 
characteristically folded bindles and that the hotel parking lot 
was open to the public). State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 580-01 
(Utah App. 1992). 
In any event, defendant's first two challenges are without 
merit. First, it is apparent from the officer's rendition of the 
incident, i.e, the patrol vehicles pulling up on both sides of 
defendant's car and defendant's being approached as soon as he 
exited, that things happened quickly. The prosecutor's statement 
that defendant "jumped" out of his car (R. 88) was evidently a 
characterization of defendant's movements based on the officer's 
testimony and one which the trial court found reasonable. See 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39 (granting the trial court some measure 
of discretion when determining "facts" based on a witnesses 
demeanor). However, any error improperly suggesting defendant's 
suspicious conduct, and thus probable cause to seize evidence, is 
at most harmless. The evidence was seized not because defendant 
acted suspiciously, but because it was evidence of criminal 
conduct observed in open view, an independent ground establishing 
probable cause, which defendant does not challenge. 
Similarly, the trial court's omission of defendant's refusal 
to give consent, evidence of which was based exclusively on 
defendant's testimony, was evidently a reflection on defendant's 
credibility. See Price. 827 P.2d at 249-50 n. 6 (deferring to 
the trial court's determination of consent to search because of 
its "position of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and 
other factors bearing on credibility"). 
Defendant's third and fourth challenges are discussed in the 
body of this brief. 
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On appeal, defendant challenges this finding, claiming that 
the officer lacked sufficient experience to establish the bindle 
as incriminating evidence. Appellant's Br. at 9. The 
proceedings and testimony at the suppression hearing speak 
otherwise. Defense counsel made one foundational objection to 
Officer Jackson's testimony, which was overruled (R. 81). 
Officer Jackson testified without further objection, and then 
Officer Harris testified without any objection. Officer Jackson 
testified that he had seen numerous bindles of the type found in 
defendant's car during his three year assignment with Metro 
Narcotics and that many of those bindles contained cocaine (R. 
80-82) . Officer Harris testified that he had also been assigned 
to narcotics and had "run into" bindles several times in his 
other assignments (R. 84). He also described in detail the 
characteristics of the "pharmaceutical fold" used in constructing 
a bindle (R. 85-86). 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding, 
claiming that the characteristically folded paper did not 
sufficiently establish it as incriminating evidence before it had 
actually been opened and found to contain a controlled substance. 
Appellant's Br. at 16-17. However, the distinctive configuration 
of folded paper justified the officers' belief that it contained 
contraband. See State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1983) 
(distinctive configuration of gun case indicated its contents). 
"Some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun 
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable 
10 
expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred 
from their outward appearance." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 
753, 764 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (1979); Brown, 460 U.S. at 
742-43, 103 S. Ct. at 1545 (probable cause to seize contraband 
based on police officer's reasonable belief that a distinctively 
knotted balloon was commonly used to package narcotics). Indeed, 
this Court has specifically held, in the context of the plain 
view exception to the warrant requirement, that observation of a 
plainly visible paper bindle discovered in the course of an 
administrative search is "clearly incriminating." State v. 
Cornwall. 810 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991). Under the 
circumstances of this case, the officers' observation amply 
supports the trial court's findings that the incriminating 
evidence in open view provided the necessary probable cause to 
enter the vehicle in order to seize it.4 
Defendant relies on State v. Larocco for the proposition 
that the police officer's actions of unlocking and opening the 
4
 Defendant also cursorily attacks the sufficiency of the 
foundation for police officers' testimony about the bindle of 
cocaine found in defendant's car because the bindle was not 
produced in the trial court. Appellant's Br. at 9, 12. Because 
this claim is made without supporting legal argument or 
authority, the Court should decline to consider it. State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992). Appellant's Br. at 9. Also, 
the claim is waived because defendant failed to object at the 
hearing. See Price, 837 P.2d at 580-01. Moreover, defendant 
never challenged the police officers as to whether the bindle 
they seized was folded any differently than they described it at 
the hearing. 
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car door constituted an unlawful search.5 Plainly, just as in 
Larocco, defendant here had an expectation of privacy in the 
interior of his automobile. As the United States Supreme Court 
has stated: "[A] car's interior as a whole is . . . subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the 
police." New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 106 S. Ct. 
960, 966-67 (1986). 
Here, the officers had probable cause to seize the 
incriminating evidence prior to entering the vehicle, just as the 
law established by Larocco requires. The action of opening the 
door did not reveal any new information, but instead only secured 
the item for which probable cause to seize already existed. 
Indeed, the officers' actions can be more reasonably 
characterized as an entry into a constitutionally-protected area 
necessary to effectuate a seizure. This distinguishes it from a 
search, which implies looking in an effort to find or discover 
something and which "compromises the individual interest in 
privacy." Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); See 
5
 The State responds to defendant's claims based on Larocco, 
noting, however, that Larocco was only a plurality opinion. As 
this Court has noted: "The precedential value of the Larocco 
rationale is somewhat unclear . . . because Justice Durham's 
reasoning was joined only by Justice Zimmerman. Justice Stewart 
concurred in the result, but provided no insight into his 
rationale. Because he concurred only in the result, and because 
Justice Durham arrived at the result by using state constitutional 
analysis, it is possible that Justice Stewart arrived at his 
conclusion strictly through a Fourth Amendment approach." State v. 
Stricklinq. 844 P.2d 979, 985 n.2 (Utah App. 1992). In fact, 
Justice Stewart has subsequently stated that his concurrence in 
Larocco. did not signal his acceptance of Justice Durham's state 
constitutional analysis. State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 
1994) (Stewart, J.# concurring). 
12 
State v. Echevarrieta. 621 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 1980). 
B. Exigent Circumstances. 
Nonetheless, neither probable cause nor evidence observed in 
open view alone will suffice to justify a warrantless seizure. 
Morck. 821 P.2d at 1193; Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470; State v. 
Belcrard. 840 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1992). In addition, the 
State must show that exigent circumstances justified the 
officer's seizure of the bindle without first obtaining a search 
warrant. Ibid. 
In this case, the car was parked in the parking lot of the 
Colonial Hotel, located at Fourteenth South and State Street, a 
hotel apparently frequented by prostitutes. The trial court 
concluded that there were exigent circumstances justifying the 
warrantless seizure of the bindle because defendant's car was in 
a public parking lot, open to the view of prostitutes and their 
Johns, presenting the danger of theft or destruction of evidence 
(Findings, par. 4; R. 98-99). Defendant correctly points out 
that there was no specific testimony supporting facts referenced 
by the trial court. Appellant's Br. at 18. However, this Court 
can take judicial notice of the fact that the South State Street 
area is a center of prostitution in Salt Lake City and that drug 
use is often associated with prostitution. Utah R. Evid. 201. 
See also State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) 
(witness was both a drug addict and a prostitute); State v. 
Tavlor, 599 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1979) (defendant supported her 
drug addiction through prostitution); State v. Jones, 585 P.2d 
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445, 446 (Utah 1978) (same). The bindle was on the front seat of 
the car, in open view of anyone who happened to be in the parking 
lot. Further, from both defendant's and the police officers' 
entries into the parking lot, it is apparent that the lot was 
open to the public. Under such circumstances, it represented an 
obvious invitation to theft and subsequent destruction of the 
evidence. Prevention of destruction of the evidence, as well as 
protection of the public from access to the drugs, created the 
exigencies that justified the immediate warrantless seizure of 
the bindle. Morck, 821 P.2d at 1193; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70 
(and cases cited therein). 
Defendant further challenges the trial court's conclusion 
that if defendant were only cited, he could drive away before the 
issuance of a warrant, and that if he were taken into custody the 
police would be remiss in not seizing contraband left in open 
view to the public (Findings, par. 4; R. 99). Defendant 
acknowledges the validity of the trial court's justification for 
the seizure if he were merely cited and allowed to drive away 
Appellant's Br. at 18. 
However, defendant attacks the trial court's reasoning in 
the event he were booked, arguing that if the police had probable 
cause to apply for a warrant, they could have prevented him from 
driving off by arresting him, taking him into custody, as they 
did, and by remaining at the car while application was made for a 
telephonic warrant. The argument fails because, assuming 
probable cause had been established by the discovery of the 
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bindle in open view, the police could neither reasonably let the 
car to remain on the street following defendant's arrest nor 
towed it without first seizing the bindle. 
Defendant baldly asserts that "[a] telephonic warrant was 
also available to the officers." Appellant's Br. at 19. The 
Utah Supreme Court has " [not decided] whether the prosecution has 
the burden of proving the unavailability of a telephone warrant 
in order to demonstrate sufficient exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless search . . . ." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1267 (Utah 1987). This Court also has twice held it 
unnecessary for the State to show the unavailability of a 
telephonic warrant, which is "only one of several factors 
relevant to the exigency determination." Citv of Orem. 868 P.2d 
at 1393 (citing with approval Morck, 821 P.2d at 1194 n.l). 
Moreover, there exists a dispute within the Utah Supreme Court 
regarding the ease with which a telephonic warrant can be 
obtained, suggesting that its ready availability is in doubt. 
Compare Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68 (Hall, C.J., noting the 
substantial requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4(2) for 
obtaining a telephonic warrant and suggesting that more than a 
simple phone call is necessary to obtain such a warrant) (Howe, 
J., and Stewart, J., concurring) with Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470 
(Durham, J., noting section 77-23-4(2) in support of "warrants-
when-practicable policy) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Defendant 
did not argue the availability of a telephonic warrant at trial 
and fails to support his bald assertion on appeal with any legal 
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argument or authority as to whom the burden should be assigned. 
Therefore, the Court should not consider defendant's argument 
that a telephonic warrant was available in support of his 
challenge to the trial court's finding of exigent circumstances. 
State v. Price, 837 P.2d at 580-01 (argument not preserved in 
trial court waived on appeal); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984) (refusing to consider argument unsupported by 
argument or legal authority). 
Given the exigencies noted by the trial court, the trial 
court properly concluded that sufficient exigent circumstances 
existed to justify the warrantless seizure of the bindle. 
However, even if this Court should find the trial court was 
mistaken in its conclusion it can justify the seizure of the 
bindle as a search incident to arrest.6 
POINT II 
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF THE BINDLE WAS 
JUSTIFIED AS A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
One of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement is a search incident to arrest. Stricklincr, 844 P.2d 
at 985. The burden is on the State to show that the 
circumstances of the seizure falls within one of the exceptions. 
Id. 
In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court rejected a 
warrantless search of an entire house of a defendant while 
6
 The trial court did not base its holding on a search 
incident to arrest theory; however, this Court may affirm the 
lower court's decision on any proper ground. State v. Elder. 815 
P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991). 
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recognizing a limited right of the police to search the 
defendant's premises incident to his arrest, i.e., areas "within 
the defendant's immediate control" to prevent him from reaching a 
weapon to effect an escape or destroying evidence. Chime1 v. 
California. 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). 
Since Chime1. the search incident to arrest exception, as 
applied to automobiles searches and seizures, has been 
dramatically broadened. In New York v. Belton. the police 
conducted a search uncovering cocaine, incident to an arrest for 
speeding, of the defendant's jacket found within the passenger 
compartment of the car while the defendant and three other 
occupants were detained outside. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454, 457-63, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2862-65 (1981). The Supreme Court 
overturned the New York Court of Appeals' rejection of the 
search, notwithstanding the appellate court's finding that there 
was "no longer any danger that the arrestee or his confederate 
might gain access to the article." Id. 453 U.S. at 456, 101 S. 
Ct. at 2862. Recognizing that the search incident to arrest 
principle in Chime1 could be clearly stated, the Court noted that 
the principle was nonetheless difficult to apply in specific 
cases, and established a bright-line rule that police officers 
could readily apply without engaging in a subtle analysis to 
determine the probability that weapons or evidence were present. 
Id. 453 U.S. at 458-61, 101 S. Ct. at 2863-64. The Court held 
that when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an-
automobile, he may, as an incident of that 
arrest, search the passenger compartment of 
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that automobile. 
It follows from this conclusion that the 
police may also examine the contents of any 
containers found within the passenger 
compartment, for if the passenger compartment 
is within reach of the arrestee, so also will 
containers in it be within his reach. . . . 
Such a container, may of course, be searched 
whether it is open or closed, since the 
justification for the search is not that the 
arrestee has no privacy interest in the 
container, but that the lawful custodial 
arrest justifies the infringement of any 
privacy interest the arrestee may have. 
Id. 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. 
Relying on Belton, federal courts have consistently 
permitted searches incident to arrest over the defendants' claims 
that items were clearly outside their practical range of control 
or accessibility. See United States v. McCradv. 774 F.2d 868, 
870-71 (8th Cir. 1985) (police opened locked glove compartment 
with key removed from ignition while defendant detained in police 
car); United States v. Karlin. 852 F.2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir. 
1988) (defendant handcuffed in rear of police car), cert, denied, 
489 U.S. 1021, 109 S. Ct. 1142 (1989); United States v. Cotton, 
751 F.2d 1146, 1147-50 (10th Cir. 1985) (defendant handcuffed 
beside car in presence of two police officers). 
Furthermore, many courts have permitted searches incident to 
arrest in circumstances where the arrestee's access to the item 
recovered in the search was as seemingly improbable as 
defendant's in this case, under the Belton rule. See United 
States v. Woodv, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269 (7th Cir.) (officers open 
locked glove box with ignition key while the defendant was 
18 
handcuffed in the rear seat of the patrol car), pet. for cert. 
filed. No. 95-5330 (July 24, 1995); State v. Ouinones, 574 A.2d 
1308, 1310-11 (Conn. App.) (police officer recover bags of heroin 
from locked car using key seized from the handcuffed defendant's 
pocket while he was detained some distance from car by another 
officer), cert, denied, 576 A.2d 546 (1990); Pack v. 
Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 921, 922-23 (Va. App. 1988) (recovery of 
cocaine from locked bag found on rear floorboard of car using key 
seized from handcuffed defendant). 
In Utah, searches in circumstances very similar to those 
discussed above have been upheld under the Belton rule. In State 
v. Kent, the court upheld a search, yielding a sawed-off shotgun, 
incident to arrest of the defendant/parolee, where the defendant 
was detained and handcuffed in the presence of ten police 
officers. State v. Kent, 665 P.2d 1317, 1317-18 (Utah 1983). 
This Court upheld the search of a diaper bag containing a gun 
incident to the arrest of a homicide suspect. State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769, 783-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(1991). In that case the defendant and his wife were ordered to 
the ground by at least two police officers while one of the 
officers located the diaper bag in a baby stroller about ten feet 
from the arrestees Id. at 784. Doubtful that the Harrisons could 
reach the diaper bag before the officers could intervene, this 
Court nonetheless relied on Belton and Kent, noting that 
,f[p]olice restraint and physical removal of the arrestee, then, 
while limiting the arrestee's ability to actually reach into a 
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particular area, does not automatically prohibit police from 
searching that area," Id. at 784-85 n.29. 
Defendant does not dispute that he was legally arrested for 
prostitution when he exited his car. Following his arrest, 
defendant was handcuffed and placed in the rear of Officer 
Jackson's car (R. 78, 83-84). Immediately thereafter Officer 
Jackson, having seen a bindle of cocaine in open view on the 
front seat of defendant's car, unlocked the car with the keys 
recovered from defendant and seized the bindle (R. 79). It does 
not appear that the officer's entry into defendant's car went 
beyond the seizure of the bindle or that the officers conducted 
any further search. 
On the weight of authority, this Court's recognition of the 
rule in Belton, and the very fleeting and narrow intrusion on 
defendant's privacy occasioned by the officers' actions, this 
Court should uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress on the alternative ground that the bindle was 
seized incident to defendant's lawful arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress and judgment of conviction be affirmed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
The application of the search incident to arrest exception 
to general prohibition against warrantless searches to the facts 
of this case warrants oral argument and a written published 
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opinion to further develop Utah law in^this area. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE. OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Plaintiff, ) LAW AND ORDER 
-vs-
) CaseNo.911901754FS 
JAMES LEE MORENO, 
' Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence came on regularly for hearing on March 
20, 1992. The Court heard testimony from the defendant, James Moreno, and from police 
officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris. The Court also heard argument from defendant's 
counsel and the State's counsel. Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the following: 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
1. On 23 October 1991, the defendant approached a woman on Main Street near 
1400 South. The woman was working with officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris in an 
effort to suppress prostitution activities in the area, but the defendant did not know this. He 
offered the woman $35.00 to "party" with him. The decoy agreed and told defendant to follow 
her to the Colonial Hotel parking lot. As soon as defendant stopped in the lot, his vehicle was 
sandwiched by two police cars. The defendant jumped from his car and quickly locked it. He 
was then placed under arrest for solicitation of prostitution. 
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2. Officer Harris, who arrested the defendant, handcuffed and searched him incident 
to his arrest. The contents of defendant's pockets were placed on the roof of defendant's vehicle. 
Defendant was then taken to one of the police cars where Harris began writing a citation for the 
solicitation charge. 
3. At about the same time, Officer Jackson looked through the window of 
defendant's vehicle and observed what his experience led him to believe was a "bindle of 
cocaine" on the passenger front seat. He pointed this bindle out to Officer Harris, then took 
defendant's keys from the roof of the car, unlocked the vehicle, and removed the bindle. 
4. White powder in the bindle field tested positive for the presence of cocaine. The 
defendant admitted to police officers that the bindle contained cocaine and belonged to him. 
These facts lead to the following: 
CONCLUSIONS QF LAW 
1. Although a warrantless search such as the one here is presumed to be illegal, Utah 
law recognizes that an automobile may be searched if there is both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1193 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Probable cause to open the defendant's locked vehicle was established as soon as 
the drug-experienced officer observed the bindle in open view on the front seat. No search had 
taken place before this observation of the contraband. The police were certainly entitled to view 
whatever a member of the public could see from that same vantage point State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48,51 (Utah). 
3. Officer Jackson's seizure of the bindle necessitated his entry into the defendant's 
car. The entry into the car without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances. 
4. The exigent circumstances in this case were the obvious invitation to theft and/or 
destruction of evidence which the easily-seen bindle presented for anyone looking into 
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defendant's car. This parking lot was open to the public, including prostitutes and their Johns. If 
the defendant were to receive only a citation, he could drive his vehicle away before police could 
obtain a warrant to seize the bindle. If the defendant were to be booked, the police would be 
remiss to allow such obvious contraband to be left in open view in a public place while the 
vehicle's driver was taken to the jail. 
5. Officer Jackson's warrantless entry into the vehicle to seize the bindle complied 
with all constitutional strictures. 
BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in this matter shall be and hereby is DENIED. 
DATED this / ^"day of February, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES S. SAWAYA, JudgtT 
Approved as to form: 
JOHNR.BUCHER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order was mailed to John R. Bucher, Attorney for Defendant James 
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March 20, 1993 
THE COURT: Call the matter of State vs. James 
Moreno, Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The record may 
show that defendant is present with counsel John Bucher; 
Mr. Vuyk appearing for the state. 
MR. BUCHER: I would like to call the defendant 
to the stand. 
THE COURT: That's not how we proceed usually, 
is it? 
MR. VUYK: When we have police officers—-I don't 
know if they are back yet. They had to run over to a 
trial. 
THE COURT: Your motion places the burden on the 
state. 
MR. BUCHER: I couldn't see them out there. I 
saw them earlier--
MR. VUYK: They will be back momentarily. If he 
wants to proceed out of order, that's fine. 
JAMES MORENO 
Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. BUCHER: 
Q Would you state your name and address? 



























Q Are you the defendant in this action? 1 
A Yes, I am. 1 
Q I would like to call your attention to October 1 
23, 1991, and ask if you have had occasion to come in 1 
contact with any police officers at that time? 1 
A Yes, I did. 1 
Q What time was that, if you recall? 1 
A About 8 p.m. 1 
Q Bow did you come in contact with them? Where 1 
were you? 1 
A I was at 14th South and State Street. Actually 1 
I came—it was 14th Street and Main. 1 
Q In what city? 1 
A Salt Lake City. 
Q What occurred at that location? 1 
A They said I was under arrest for prostitution, 1 
for soliciting. 1 
Q Is that the first time you came in contact with 1 
the police officers that day? 1 
A Yes. 
Q Did you come in contact with an undercover 
officer prior to coming in contact with the police 
officers? 




Q When was that? 
A On the sane day, eight o'clock. 
Q And where was that? 
A 14th Street and State. 
Q What occurred at that time? 
A A girl was out there. I pulled up, and I was 
headed to a party. And I asked her if she wanted to go 
party. She said she was working. I said I would give her 
thirty-five dollars to go with me and party. 
Q And what occurred after you said that? 
A She then told me she would, to follow her in her 
car, that we could party over at some hotel or something. 
And 1 followed her, and when we got over there, she got out 
of her vehicle. I got out of mine. I locked it, and all 
of a sudden, I had officers flashing badges and telling me 
to get back in my car. 
Q Where were you at this occasion? 
A At a hotel on 14th Street and State. I don't 
remember the name of the hotel. 
Q What did they say to you when they approached 
you? 
A To get back in my car, and I said, no. 
Q What did they do then? 
A Told me I was under arrest. I said, "For what?" 
And they told me for soliciting. I said, "I didn't 
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1 I solicit. I didn't solicit nobody." Then they told me to 
k I put my keys on the car and cuffed me and asked if they 
could go inside my car. I said, "No." They asked me if I 
was hiding something. I said, "No." I just didn't want 
them in my car. 
Q Where were you standing in relation to the 
automobile when this conversation was going on? 
A Away from it, until they made me walk back up to 
it on the back. 
Q What occurred then? 
A I was placed in a vehicle with cuffs on. Then 
they walked up and started the light in the cars. They 
said, "I think he has something to hide or something. 
Maybe that's a bindle or something." They seen something, 
a piece of paper or something and said, "Well, I think that 
is reasonable doubt," or whatever. So they got my keys, 
unlocked it, went through it, came back out, said I was 
under arrest for coke—possession. 
Q Did they ask you for your consent to perform the 
search a second time? 
A Second time, yes. 
Q How many times did they ask you if they could 
search your vehicle? 
A About two other times. 
Q What did they say? 
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A "Are you some kind of lawyer? Do you know 
something we don't? We have a right to go in there." I 
said, "Well, I can't stop you. You are cops and stuff." 
Q Where was your vehicle parked in relation to the 
other automobiles at the motel? 
A Against the pool, facing north. 
Q Was it parked in the regular place where 
vehicles park for the motel or parked in some other place? 
A There were other vehicles parked around the pool 
area, so I would say so. 
Q Was it obstructing the lane of traffic inside 
the motel? 
A No. 
Q What vehicle was that, that you are talking 
about? 
A *78 Datsun station wagon. 
Q Are you the owner of that vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it registered in your name? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VUYK: 
Q You indicated that police officers asked you 
twice to look at your car? 
00075 
8 
A Look inside, yes. 
Q Isn't it a fact that they indicated to you they 
saw a bindle in plain view on the front seat of the car? 
A No. 
Q Did you make any statement to them with regard 
to the cocaine? 
A No. 
Q You never told them it was cocaine for your own 
personal use? 
A Not until afterwards I said it is cocaine. 
Q Bow long afterwards? 
A Nay after I was arrested. They brought it and 
showed me and was taking pictures of me, and stuff like 
that. 
Q Now, you indicate that you were under arrest, 
and you were handcuffed and you were in a police car; is 
that right? Any question in your mind? 
A With the strap across me. 
Q A strap across you? You were under arrest and 
had the cuffs on? 
A Yes. 
Q That's all I have. 
TBE COURT: Anything further. 
MR. BUCBER: Nothing. 
TBE COURT: You may step down. 
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MR. VUYK: I would like to call Officer Harvey 
Jackson. 
HARVEY JACKSON 
Called as a witness, having been duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. VUYK: 
Q Would you state your name? 
A Harvey Jackson. 
Q Your occupation? 
A Police officer for Salt Lake City. 
THE COURT: First name? 
THE WITNESS: Harvey. 
MR.VUYK: What is your current assignment? 
A I am currently assigned to burglary. 
Q In October of last year, what were you assigned 
to? 
A Special investigations and vice. 
Q And on that occasion, did you have an 
opportunity to come in contact with a James Moreno? 
A Yes. 
Q How did that come about? 
A Mr. Moreno made a deal with one of our decoys, 
followed her back to the Colonial Hotel. We followed him 
back to the hotel. 
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Q Bow did your contact come about? 
A We followed his vehicle to the hotel by the 
swimming pool area. Detective Harris was behind them with 
some emergency equipment on. I went around to the other 
side of the swimming pool and pulled in front of Mr. 
Moreno98 vehicle. 
Q What happened then? 
A Mr. Moreno got out, locked his door, stood 
there, basically said something like, "You know, what is 
going on, what's happening?" 
Q What happened then? 
A Detective Harris walked up, told him he was 
under arrest for soliciting sex, handcuffed him, took him 
back to his car. 
Q Did you, in fact, search him at that time? 
A Detective Harris did, yes. 
Q Where did that search take place? 
A Beside Mr. Moreno's car. 
Q What was found on him at that time? 
A He had some car keys, some cash and coins, that 
type of thing. 
Q Where were they put? 
A On the roof of the car. 
Q Was Mr. Moreno then removed from that area? 
A Yes, sir. 
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1 I Q Did you then inspect the car at all? 
2 1 A I walked back to the car, looked inside. 
3 I Q What did you see? 
4 1 A On the passenger side there was, I believe, a 
5 I dark-colored, maybe black-colored cassette holder. In 
6 I front of that looked like a folded bindle, the type you 
7 I carry cocaine in. I went back to Detective Harris and 
8 I said, "I want you to come back and witness this." He 
9 I walked back with me. I took the keys off the roof of the 
10 I car, unlocked it, went inside the vehicle. 
11 I Q What did you then find? 
12 I A I reached down, grabbed the folded paper. It 
13 I was a bindle, unfolded, with some white powder in it. I 
14 I gave it to Detective Harris. He did a field test on it. 
15 I It tested positive for cocaine. 
16 I Q Did you have a conversation with the defendant 
17 after that? 
18 I A I did not. 
19 J Q When you looked into the car, was this bindle in 
BO I plain view? 
El I A Yes, it was. 
82 J Q Has the defendant under arrest at the time? 
D3 I A Yes, he was. 




BY MR. BUCHER: 
Q Officer Jackson, do you have it with you? 
A I beg your pardon? 
Q Do you have the thing, described as a "bindle" 
here with you? 
A No. 
Q What did it look like? 
A It was a folded piece of paper, looked like a 
piece of magazine or something just folded the way they 
folded bindles. 
Q Well, how big was it? 
A Probably about that size, maybe an inch and a 
half. 
Q And inch and a half square. Could you see 
inside? 
A No, sir, it was colored paper. 
Q Colored? 
A Well, like magazine, like it wasn't clear. You 
couldn't see inside. 
Q Looked like it came from a magazine? 
A That's what it looked like, yes, sir. 
Q Thank you. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VUYK: 

































Yes, sir. 1 
Bow do you have that acquaintance? 1 
I have seen bindles many times. I was assigned 
Narcotics for three years. 
During that period was this the type of bindle 1 
you normally found? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. BUCHER: Object. Move to strike. I don't 









MR. VUYK: Be testified he's been a narcotics 
for two years. 
TBE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. VUYK: 
Is this the type normally found? 
Yes, sir. 




BY MR. BUCBER: 
Bow many bindles have you seen in your two years 
as a narcotics officer? 1 
A 
Q 
I couldn't give you a number, quite a few. 1 
Over ten? 1 
0008! 
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1 I A Yes, sir. 
2 Q And out. ot ttteae biddies, t-fc*t ^jou fcera ««e?i, 
3 I how many have been of this kind of paper? 
4 I A I couldn't give you a number on that. 
5 Q Of the number that you have seen, of this kind 
6 of paper, how many of them did it l»ter~was it later 
7 I established in court it had a controlled substance inside 
8 of it? 
9 A That's difficult to say, sir. 
10 I Q Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Vuyk, anything further? 
12 I MR. TO**.*. Ora <$&%»ti©Ti. ^*r% ttex* * l«t oi 
13 I them wrapped that way that had cocaine in? 
a4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
&5 I THE COURT: You may step down. 
16 I MR. VUYK: Call Officer Harris. 
17 DAVID HARRIS 
18 I Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 
19 I was examined and testified as follows: 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 I BY MR. VUYK: 
12 \ $ Vlould ^ou wt*t« *youx Tveafte*? 
D I A David Harris. 
M I Q Occupation? 


































Your present assignment? 1 
Special investigations, the vice unit. 1 
Were you so involved in October of last year? I 
Yes, I was. 1 
Did you come in contact in October, I believe 1 





How did that come about? 
He were working a decoy operation. One of the 1 




I followed his vehicle to the Colonial Hotel 
lot. The vehicle entered the parking lot. I 
my emergency equipment to stop the vehicle. After 





Jackson pulled in front of it. The vehicle 1 
Mr. Moreno exited the vehicle. 1 
What did you do then? 1 
I approached Mr. Moreno, placed him under arrest 







Did you handcuff him? 1 
Yes. 
Did you search him? 1 
Yes. 
What did you do with the items you found on him? 1 
I placed them on top of one of the cars—whether 1 
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it was mine or his. Mine was directly behind his. 
Q What did you do then? 
A Placed him in my vehicle, passenger's side, sat 
down next to him, began to write him a citation. 
Q He was in handcuffs at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q What happened then? 
A Sergeant Jackson approached me and told me that 
he had something he wanted me to witness in Mr. Moreno's 
vehicle. I got out of the car, and Sergeant Jackson 
pointed out the folded paper bindle, that was discussed 
earlier, sitting on the car's front seat. 
Q What did it appear to be to you? 
A Folded bindle, pharmaceutical-type fold, orange 
in color. 
Q What do you mean by pharmaceutical type? 
A That's what I have been told the fold on a 
bindle is called—a "pharmaceutical" type. 
Q Have you had any experience with these bindles? 
A Yes. 
Q In what capacity? 
A I have been assigned also to narcotics and run 
into them several times in patrol in my other assignments. 





Q This particular item was folded that way? 
A Yes. It was folded in a little—in a square. 
Q And what did you do then? 
A I watched Sergeant Jackson open it. It 
contained a white powder. I took that, and I had field 
test kits for cocaine. I tested it. It tested positive. 
Q What did you do then? 
A Placed it into evidence, eventually. 
Q What did you do. Did you have any further 
conversation with Mr. Moreno? 
A Yes, Mr. Moreno--just as I was beginning to test 
it, stated, "It is cocaine." And at some point, I don't 
recall when—when I was discussed it, talking with him, he 
said, "I am not a dealer. It was for his private use." 
Q That's all I have. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUCHER: 
Q Officer Harris, what is a pharmaceutical fold, 
again? 
A The paper is folded over several times so 
that—I don't know how to describe it. But it folds a 
small square piece of paper so it can hold a piece of 
paper. 
Q Is that it's only characteristic? It is folded 
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into a small square piece or is it folded in a particular 
way besides that? Let me rephrase it, if you didn't 
understand it. 
A I understand. 
Q Is the only way you could tell it was a 
pharmaceutical fold is because it was folded into a square? 
A No. 
Q Would you tell me the other reasons you could 
tell it was a pharmaceutical fold? 
A It looked like the fold that I have seen, that's 
been described to me as a pharmaceutical fold on a bindle. 
Q Would you tell me what that is, by size, the 
square shape? 
A I could describe how it is folded. 
Q Would you? 
A You get a square, and you fold it so that it 
makes a triangle. Then you fold the edges over. Then you 
fold the top, then tuck it into the—it is hard—fold the 
top over so it tucks into the bottom. 
Q Is the size of this tucking, the fact it was a 
square—is there any other characteristic so I could call 
it a pharmaceutical fold? 
A No. 
Q Thank you. 
MR. VUYK: Nothing further. 
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THE COURT: Step down. Is that all the 
evidence? 
MR. VUYK: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: What are you claiming, Mr. 
Vuyk~plain view? 
MR. VUYK: That is right, Your Honor. The 
individual was under arrest, had been searched. It was in 
plain view. 
MR. BUCHER: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This case that you handed me, it is 
a rather lengthy opinion. 
MR. BUCHER: Would you look—the first part of 
it has to do with, I believe, a plea bargain and 
evidentiary problem. Page 16, I believe, begins the 
discussion of search and seizure in State vs. Hyde. I will 
not impose upon Your Honor to read it or even tell you what 
it says. But here is what I think it says. It says that 
in Mr. Lorroco's case, he wants to change the search and 
seizure law of automobile. I believe what this case stands 
for, if you see something inside a vehicle and exigent 
circumstances exist, you go obtain a warrant for it. If 
they saw what was obviously in plain view--a knife, a body, 
a syringe, contraband—if they saw a crime or contraband 
leading to a crime inside of a vehicle, that's what plain 
view is. Looking in there and seeing a folded up piece of 
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paper I don't believe is plain view. I believe it is 
reason to believe that maybe something has happened, and it 
could be probable cause to obtain a search warrant. But in 
my view of this case, Lorroco, his predecessor case cited 
in Lorroco, State vs. Hyde, if my interpretation is 
correct, the officers looked in there. They needed to go 
get a search warrant. I don't think it is probable cause 
to see a folded up piece of paper in someone's car. I 
think it was an excuse to search it. I think that is up to 
a magistrate, a committing magistrate, who has the decision 
to obtain a warrant. This man was not going anywhere. He 
was under arrest. There was none of the problems that 
Lorroco talked about, about reaching for a gun before 
destroying evidence. 
MR. VUYK: It is clear it falls under the cases 
where there was a legal lawful arrest. They have a right 
to look at the car and search it to determine whether, in 
fact, there are any weapons or any other type of thing. 
This is the entire process the officers had reason to be 
suspicious when he jumped out of the car and locked it. 
They were surrounded at the time. All this leads to the 
question of what could be done. Certainly, we feel that 
this was appropriate, proper, and done in the process of an 
arrest. 
THE COURT: Let me read this case. I will have 
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FIUO DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
John R. Bucher 0474 
Attorney for Defendant FEB 2 * 1995 
1343 South 1100 East 
Sal, U k . Chy. Utah 84105 . . ^ p " ^ 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
vs. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.911901754FS 
JAMES LEE MORENO, 
Defendant. Judge James S. Sawaya 
Come Now John R. Bucher, attorney for the defendant above and submits the following 
objections to those certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the plaintiff in 
the above: 
1. The defendant objects to the finding that his vehicle was "sandwiched*1 by two police cars. 
No testimony exists to support said finding and the correct testimony is on page 9 of the transcript. 
2. The defendant objects to the statement in finding number 2 that officer Jackson had experience 
which led him to believe the paper he saw in the vehicle of the defendant was oocaine. 
The Officer testified that he had been a narcotics officer for two years and that he has seen bindles 
folded the way the subject bindle was folded 
3. No conclusion of law was ever reached that the parking lot was "open to the public" 
and no evidence was ever presented in any form that the parking lot was open to the public. 
Dated this. 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr, 
18th day of February, 1995. 
Cope Esq. a Deputy District Attorney this 
00102 
